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By Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
I. Introduction
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah is the Irwin I. Cohn professor
of law and director of the international tax L.L.M.
program at the University of Michigan. He would like
to thank Peter Enrich, Walter Hellerstein, and Rick
Hills for their helpful comments. All errors are the
author’s.
The purpose of this article is to try to place the
debate about Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler in a broader
perspective by connecting it with the overall discussion of harmful tax competition. It discusses two
hypothetical scenarios under which the city of Toledo,
Ohio, is (a) a separate country and (b) a member state
of the European Union. If the first hypothetical were
true, the tax incentives offered by Toledo would
violate the rules of the World Trade Organization; if
the second hypothetical were true, the tax incentives
would also violate the Treaty of Rome, as interpreted
by the European Court of Justice. The reason for those
outcomes is that tax incentives like those at issue in
Cuno violate well established policies of both the WTO
and the ECJ designed to prevent harmful tax competition from skewing trade and investment patterns.
Thus, consideration of the two hypotheticals may shed
some light on the policy issues at stake in Cuno, as well
as on the desirable outcome if the Supreme Court were
to decide Cuno on the merits.
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On September 27, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, a case
involving interstate tax competition that has drawn numerous comments from academics and the bar.1 The case
is controversial for holding that some state tax incentives
to business are a violation of the Commerce Clause.
Because of that controversy and the ubiquitous prevalence of those incentives, it is widely expected that if the
Supreme Court reaches the merits, it will reverse.
This article tries to place the debate about Cuno in a
broader perspective by connecting it with the overall
discussion of harmful tax competition. Specifically, the
article will address two (admittedly highly unlikely)
hypotheticals: First, suppose (like the London borough of
Pimlico in the classic British film Passport to Pimlico) the
city of Toledo, Ohio, seceded from the United States and
became a separate country? Second, suppose, in addition,
that the new country of Toledo somehow became a
member state of the European Union?
The reason those hypotheticals are interesting is because it is clear that if the first hypothetical were true, the
tax incentives offered by Toledo2 (which were at issue in
Cuno) would violate the rules of the World Trade Organization; and if the second hypothetical were true, the tax
incentives would also violate the Treaty of Rome, as
interpreted by the European Court of Justice. Moreover,
the reason for those outcomes is that tax incentives like
those at issue in Cuno violate well-established policies of
both the WTO and the ECJ that are designed to prevent
harmful tax competition from skewing trade and investment patterns. Thus, consideration of the two hypotheticals may shed some light on the policy issues at stake in

1
Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, Doc 2004-17647,
2004 TNT 174-3 (6th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. granted sub nom.
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno (No. 04-1704) and Wilkins v. Cuno
(No. 04-1724) (Sept. 27, 2005). For the debate on Cuno, see, e.g.,
Edward Zelinsky, ‘‘Ohio Incentives Decision Revisited,’’ State
Tax Notes, Sept. 19, 2005, p. 859, and articles cited therein.
2
One of the incentives (a personal property tax exemption)
was offered by Toledo (under state law), and the other incentive
(an investment tax credit against the state corporate franchise
tax) was offered by Ohio. For ease of exposition (and because it
makes no difference to the analysis in this article), the ensuing
discussion will assume that both incentives were offered by
Toledo.
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II. The Cuno Case
In 1998 DaimlerChrysler entered into an agreement
with the city of Toledo to construct a new vehicleassembly plant near the company’s existing facility, in
exchange for various tax incentives. DaimlerChrysler
estimated that it would invest about $1.2 billion in the
project, which would provide the region with several
thousand new jobs. In return, the city and two local
school districts agreed to give DaimlerChrysler a 10-year
100 percent property tax exemption, as well as an investment tax credit of 13.5 percent against the state corporate
franchise tax for some qualifying investments. The total
value of the tax incentives was estimated to be $280
million.
The district court held that the investment tax credit
and the property tax exemption did not violate the
Commerce Clause because, although ‘‘an increase in
activity in Ohio could increase the credit and exemption
amount’’ under the two statutes, an increase in activity
outside the state would not decrease the amount of the
tax credit or exemption.3
On appeal, the plaintiffs’ primary contention was that
the Ohio statutes authorizing the investment tax credit
and personal property tax exemption violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Constitution expressly authorizes Congress to ‘‘regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States,’’ and the ‘‘negative’’ or ‘‘dormant’’ aspect of the
Commerce Clause, as construed by U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence, implicitly limits a state’s right to tax
interstate commerce.4 A tax provision satisfies the requirements of the Commerce Clause if (1) the activity
taxed has a substantial nexus with the taxing state; (2) the
tax is fairly apportioned to reflect the degree of activity
that occurs within the state; (3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) the tax is fairly
related to benefits provided by the state.5
In Cuno, the parties disagreed whether Ohio’s method
for encouraging economic investment by conferring in-

vestment tax incentives and property tax exemptions
discriminated against interstate commerce under the
third prong of the Complete Auto test.6 The Sixth Circuit
held that the investment tax credit was discriminatory,
relying on a distinction first proposed by Profs. Hellerstein and Coenen.7 The court stated:
Although the investment tax credit at issue here is
equally available to in-state and out-of-state businesses, the plaintiffs nevertheless maintain that it
discriminates against interstate economic activity
by coercing businesses already subject to the Ohio
franchise tax to expand locally rather than out-ofstate. Specifically, any corporation currently doing
business in Ohio, and therefore paying the state’s
corporate franchise tax in Ohio, can reduce its existing tax liability by locating significant new machinery
and equipment within the state, but it will receive no
such reduction in tax liability if it locates a comparable plant and equipment elsewhere. Moreover, as
between two businesses, otherwise similarly situated
and each subject to Ohio taxation, the business that
chooses to expand its local presence will enjoy a
reduced tax burden, based directly on its new in-state
investment, while a competitor that invests out-ofstate will face a comparatively higher tax burden
because it will be ineligible for any credit against its
Ohio tax.8
That, the court held, was discriminatory, rejecting the
defendants’ argument that the effect of the credit is
similar to a subsidy, which the Supreme Court has
generally upheld:
Although the defendants liken the investment tax
credit to a direct subsidy, which would no doubt
have the same economic effect, the Court has
intimated that attempts to create location incentives
through the state’s power to tax are to be treated
differently from direct subsidies despite their similarity in terms of end-result economic impact. The
majority in New Energy noted in dicta that subsidies
do not ‘‘ordinarily run afoul of [the Commerce
Clause]’’ because they are not generally ‘‘connected
with the State’s regulation of interstate
commerce.’’ . . . Thus, the distinction between a
subsidy and a tax credit, in the constitutional sense,
results from the fact that the tax credit involves
state regulation of interstate commerce through its
power to tax. In short, while we may be sympathetic to efforts by the City of Toledo to attract
industry into its economically depressed areas, we
conclude that Ohio’s investment tax credit cannot
be upheld under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution.9

6

3

Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 154 F. Supp.2d 1196 (N.D. Ohio
2001).
4
U.S. Const., Art. I, section 8, cl. 3.
5
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279, 51
L. Ed. 2d 326, 97 S. Ct. 1076 (1977).
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Walter Hellerstein and Dan Coenen, ‘‘Commerce Clause
Restraints on State Business Development Incentives,’’ 81 Cornell L. Rev. 789 (1996).
8
Cuno at 743.
9
Cuno at 746 (citations and footnote omitted).
7
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Cuno, as well as on the desirable outcome if the Supreme
Court were to decide Cuno on the merits.
This article is divided into six parts. After this introduction, Part II describes the Cuno case as decided by the
Sixth Circuit. Part III discusses from a broad policy
perspective some of the issues raised by state tax competition. Parts IV and V are the heart of the report and
discuss the two hypotheticals laid out above: how the
WTO rules would apply to the Cuno facts if Toledo were
a country, and how the ECJ would rule if Toledo were a
member of the EU. Finally, Part VI concludes by arguing
that given the policy issues at stake, the U.S. Supreme
Court should reach the merits and affirm Cuno, as a way
of spurring Congress to regulate harmful state tax competition.

COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT

III. State Tax Competition and U.S. Welfare
A. The Problem of Tax Competition12
From its beginnings late in the 19th century, the
modern state has been financed primarily by progressive
income taxation. The income tax differs from other forms
of taxation (like consumption or Social Security taxes) in
that, in theory, it includes income from capital in the tax
base, even if it is saved and not consumed. Because the
rich save more than the poor, a tax that includes income
from capital in its base is more progressive (taxes the rich
more heavily) than a tax that excludes income from
capital (for example, a consumption tax or a payroll tax).
However, the ability to tax saved income from capital
(that is, income not vulnerable to consumption taxes) is
impaired if the capital can be shifted overseas to jurisdictions where it escapes taxation.
Two recent developments have dramatically augmented the ability of individuals and corporations to
earn income overseas free of income taxation: the effective end of withholding taxation by developed countries
and the rise of production tax havens in developing
countries.13 Since the United States abolished its withholding tax on portfolio interest paid to foreigners in
1984, no major capital importing country has been able to
impose such a tax for fear of driving mobile capital
elsewhere (or increasing the cost of capital for domestic
borrowers, including the government itself).14 The result
is that individuals can generally earn investment income
free of host-country taxation in any of the world’s major
economies.15 Moreover, even developed countries find it
exceedingly difficult to effectively collect the tax on the

10

Cuno at 746.
The Court has not ruled on the plaintiffs’ petition for
certiorari from the portion of the Sixth Circuit’s decision sustaining the property tax exemption. It presumably will do so
once it has disposed of the defendants’ challenge.
12
The following two sections are based in part on Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, ‘‘The WTO, Export Subsidies, and Tax Competition,’’ in Michael Lang, Judith Herdin, and Ines Hofbauer (eds.),
WTO and Direct Taxation (2005).
13
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Globalization, Tax Competition and
the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State,’’ 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573
(2000).
14
Edward H. Gardner, ‘‘Taxes on Capital Income: A Survey,’’
in George Kopits (ed.), Tax Harmonization in the European Community (1992); Vito Tanzi, Taxation in an Integrating World (1995).
15
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and Linda Z. Swartz, ‘‘Virtual Taxation: Source Based Taxation in the Age of Derivatives,’’ 2
11

foreign income of their individual residents in the absence of withholding taxes imposed by host countries,
because the investments can be made through tax havens
with strong bank secrecy laws.16 Developing countries,
with much weaker tax administrations, find that task
almost impossible. Thus, cross-border investment income
can largely be earned free of either host- or home-country
taxation.17
For example, consider a wealthy Mexican who wishes
to earn tax-free interest income from investing in the
bonds of an American corporation. All he needs to do is
set up, for a nominal fee, a Cayman Islands corporation
to hold the bonds. The interest payments are then made
to the Caymans corporation without any U.S. tax withheld under the so-called portfolio interest exemption.18
The individual does not report the income to the Mexican
tax authorities, and they have no way of knowing that
the Caymans corporation is effectively an ‘‘incorporated
pocketbook’’ of the Mexican resident. Nor are the exchange of information provisions of the Mexico-U.S. tax
treaty of any help, because the IRS has no way of
knowing that the recipient of the interest payments is
controlled by a Mexican resident and therefore cannot
report that to the Mexican authorities. As a result, the
income is earned completely free of tax. (The Caymans,
of course, impose no income taxes of their own.)
When we switch our attention from passive to productive investment, a similar threat to the taxing capacity
of both home and host jurisdictions emerges. In the last
decade, competition for inbound investment led an increasing number of countries (103 as of 1998) to offer tax
holidays specifically geared to foreign corporate investors.19 Given the relative ease with which an integrated
multinational can shift production facilities in response
to tax rates, those ‘‘production tax havens’’ enable multinationals to derive most of their income abroad free of
host-country taxation.20 Moreover, most developed countries (including the United States) do not dare impose
current taxation (or sometimes any taxation) on the
foreign-source business income of their resident multinationals for fear of reducing the competitiveness of those

Derivatives 247 (1997); Edmund S. Cohen, ‘‘Individual International Tax Planning Employing Equity Derivatives,’’ 4 Derivatives 52 (1998); Gregory May, ‘‘Flying on Instruments: Synthetic
Investments and the Avoidance of Withholding Tax,’’ Tax Notes,
Dec. 9, 1996, p. 1225.
16
Tanzi, supra note 14.
17
Charles E. McLure Jr., ‘‘U.S. Tax Laws and Capital Flight
From Latin America,’’ 20 U. of Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 321 (1989);
Chander Kant, ‘‘Foreign Direct Investment and Capital Flight,’’
80 Princeton Studies in International Finance 1 (1996).
18
Section 871(h).
19
Raymond Vernon, In the Hurricane’s Eye (1998); United
Nations, World Investment Report (1996).
20
James R. Hines Jr. and Eric M. Rice, ‘‘Fiscal Paradise:
Foreign Tax Havens and American Business,’’ 109 Quarterly
Journal of Economics 149 (1994); Rosanne Altshuler and T. Scott
Newlon, ‘‘The Effects of U.S. Tax Policy on the Income Repatriation Patterns of U.S. Multinational Corporations,’’ in Giovannini et al. (eds.), Studies in International Taxation (1993).

(Footnote continued in next column.)
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However, the Sixth Circuit held that the property tax
exemptions were constitutional because ‘‘conditional exemptions raise no constitutional issues when the conditions for obtaining a favorable tax treatment are related to
the use or location of the property itself,’’ which the court
held was the case in Cuno.10
The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ petitions
for certiorari to review the Sixth Circuit’s decision striking down the investment tax credit and, sua sponte,
requested the parties to brief the question whether the
plaintiffs had standing in federal court to challenge the
investment tax credit.11
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the same period (from an average of 28 percent in 1965 to
almost 40 percent in 1994), and that increase is accounted
for largely by the rise of consumption and payroll taxes.29
Moreover, there is evidence that as the degree of openness of an economy in OECD member countries increases, taxes on capital tend to go down while taxes on
labor go up (the income tax is imposed on both capital
and labor, so that its stability may mask this trend).30
The same trends can be observed in developing countries as well. In non-OECD-member countries (outside
the Middle East), total government revenues as a share of
GDP rose from an average of 18.8 percent in 1975-1980 to
20.1 percent in 1986-1992.31 That growth was financed
primarily by the growth of revenues from the VAT in the
same period (from 25.5 percent of total revenues to 31.8
percent). At the same time, revenues from both the
individual and the corporate income tax were flat or
declined.32
A recent study by Keen and Simone illustrates both
the extent of that problem and its effect on developing
countries.33 Keen and Simone show that from 1990 to
2001, corporate tax rates declined in both developed and
developing countries. However, while in developed
countries that decline in the rates was matched by a
broadening of the tax base, so that no decline in revenues
can be observed,34 in developing countries, the same
period witnessed a decline of corporate tax revenues by
about 20 percent on average. That decline is particularly
important in light of the larger share of tax revenues
produced by the corporate tax in developing countries
(average of 17 percent, as opposed to 7 percent for
developed countries). Keen and Simone attribute most of
that decline to the spread of targeted tax incentives for
multinational enterprises. From 1990 to 2001 the percent
of developing countries granting tax holidays to MNEs
grew from 45 percent to 58 percent, and similar trends
can be seen for tax breaks for exporters (32 percent to 45
percent), reduced corporate rates for MNEs (40 percent to
60 percent), and free trade zones (17.5 percent to 45
percent).35 Those figures are particularly important because a companion paper by Altshuler and Grubert
shows that the evolution of country effective tax rates in
the period between 1992 and 1998 seems to have been
driven by tax competition, and that U.S. manufacturers

29

World Bank, Tax Policy Handbook (1994).
Enrique G. Mendoza, Assaf Razin, and Linda L. Tesar,
‘‘Effective Tax Rates in Macroeconomics: Estimates of Tax Rates
on Factor Income and Consumption,’’ 34 Journal of Monetary
Economics 297 (1994); Enrique G. Mendoza, Gian Maria MilesiFerretti, and Patrick Asea, ‘‘On the Ineffectiveness of Tax Policy
in Altering Long-Run Growth,’’ Centre for Economic Policy
Research Discussion Paper 1378 (1996).
31
World Bank, supra note 29.
32
Id.
33
Michael Keen and Alejandro Simone, ‘‘Is Tax Competition
Harming Developing Countries More Than Developed?’’ Tax
Notes Int’l, June 28, 2004, p. 1317.
34
Rachel Griffith and Alexander Klemm, ‘‘What Has Been the
Tax Competition Experience of the Last 20 Years?’’ Tax Notes
Int’l, June 28, 2004, p. 1299.
35
Keen and Simone, supra note 33.
30

21
Robert J. Peroni, ‘‘Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive
Reform of U.S. International Income Tax Rules,’’ 51 U. Miami L.
Rev. 975 (1997).
22
James R. Hines Jr., ‘‘The Flight Paths of Migratory Corporations,’’ 6 Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 447 (1991).
23
http://www.intel.com/intel/intelis/sites.htm (1998).
24
Intel Annual Report (1999).
25
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘‘International Taxation of Electronic
Commerce,’’ 52 Tax L. Rev. 507 (1997).
26
Jeffrey Owens and Jacques Sasseville, Emerging Issues in Tax
Reform (1997); Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far?
(1997).
27
Owens and Sasseville, supra note 26.
28
Id.
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multinationals against multinationals of other countries.21 If they did, new multinationals could be set up as
residents of jurisdictions that do not tax that foreignsource income.22 Thus, business income can also be
earned abroad largely free of either host- or homecountry taxation.
For example, Intel Corp., a top 10 multinational, has
operations in more than 30 countries around the globe.
The company states that ‘‘an Intel chip developed at a
design center in Oregon, might be manufactured at a
wafer fabrication facility in Ireland, packaged and tested
in Malaysia, and then sold to a customer in Australia.
Another chip might be designed in Japan, fabricated in
Israel, packaged and tested in Arizona, and sold in
China.’’23 Specifically, outside the United States, Intel has
major manufacturing facilities in Puerto Rico, China,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Ireland, and Israel.24 Thus,
outside the United States, all of Intel’s manufacturing
facilities are located in countries granting tax holidays.
Nor does Intel pay current U.S. tax on its income from
those foreign operations, because, under U.S. law, active
income earned by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals is not taxed until it is repatriated in the form of
dividends, which Intel can delay for many years.25 Thus,
the effective tax rate on Intel’s foreign-source income is
far below the nominal U.S. corporate rate of 35 percent.
If income from capital can escape the income tax net,
the tax becomes, in effect, a tax on labor. Several empirical studies have suggested that in some developed jurisdictions the effective tax rate on income from capital
approaches zero, and tax rates on capital have tended to
go down sharply since the early 1980s (when exchange
controls were relaxed).26 As a result, countries that used
to rely on the revenues from the income tax are forced to
increase relatively regressive taxes. The two fastest growing taxes in OECD member countries in recent years have
been consumption taxes (from 12 percent of total revenues in 1965 to 18 percent in 1995) and payroll taxes
(from 19 percent to 27 percent), both of which are more
regressive than the income tax.27 Over the same period,
the personal and corporate income taxes have not grown
as a percentage of total revenues (the personal income tax
accounted for 26 percent of total revenues in 1965 and 27
percent in 1995, while the figures for the corporate
income tax are 9 percent and 8 percent, respectively).28
The total tax revenue as a percentage of gross domestic
product in developed countries went up sharply during
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B. State Tax Competition
So much for tax competition among countries. What
about tax competition among states in a federal country
like the United States?
States are different from countries in one obvious way:
People are free to move in and out of them at will. On
that basis, Charles Tiebout famously defended the efficiency of state tax competition as reflecting the wishes of
state residents for a larger or smaller public sector. An
enormous amount of literature exists examining and
reexamining the Tiebout hypothesis in this context.37
However, the issue is not relevant to the kind of tax
competition described above, which does not involve
setting general tax rates, but rather specific tax rates for
particular companies. That type of tax competition is
rarely an election issue, and does not involve individual
voters’ choice of the desirable size of their state government in the way general tax competition does.
Thus, state tax competition for business involves other
issues, relating to the desirability of states offering those
incentives. The standard advice by economists to ‘‘small
open economies’’ is that they should refrain from taxing
foreign investors, because those investors cannot be
made to bear the burden of any tax imposed by the
capital importing country.38 Therefore, the tax will necessarily be shifted to less-mobile factors in the host
country, like labor or land, and it is more efficient to tax
those factors directly. That argument presumably applies
to states as well as countries, because they are generally
small open economies in the economic sense (that is, they
have no power to set tariffs or influence the terms of
trade). But while that argument seems quite valid as
applied to portfolio investment, it seems less valid regarding foreign direct investment (FDI) for two reasons.
First, the standard advice does not apply if a foreign tax
credit is available in the home country of the investor,
which frequently would be the case for FDI.39 Second, the
standard advice assumes that the host country (or state)
is small. However, an extensive literature on multinationals suggests that they typically exist to earn economic
rents.40 In that case, the host country or state is no longer
‘‘small’’ in the economic sense. That is, there is a reason
for the investor to be there and not elsewhere. Therefore,
any tax imposed on those rents (as long as it is below 100

percent) will not necessarily drive the investor to leave
even if it is unable to shift the burden of the tax to labor
or landowners.
That argument clearly holds in the case of rents linked
to a specific location, like natural resources or a large
market. But what if the rent can be earned in a large
number of potential locations?41 In that case, the host
country will not be able to tax the rent if the multinational
can credibly threaten to go elsewhere, although once the
investment has been made, the rent can be taxed. That
situation, which is probably the most common, would
require coordinated action to enable all host countries (or
states) to tax the rent earned within their borders.
That relates to a second argument, which is that host
countries (or states) need to offer tax incentives to be
competitive. An extensive literature has demonstrated
that taxes frequently play an important role in determining investment location decisions, after other factors like
labor costs and infrastructure have been taken into
consideration.42 But all of those studies emphasize that
tax incentives are crucial given the availability of those
incentives elsewhere.43 Thus, it can be argued that given the
need for tax revenues, states would in general prefer to
refrain from granting tax incentives, if only they could be
assured that no other state would be able to grant them.44

Restricting the ability of states to
compete in granting tax incentives
does not truly restrict their autonomy
or counter their interests.
Thus, restricting the ability of states to compete in
granting tax incentives does not truly restrict their autonomy or counter their interests. That is the case whenever they grant the incentive only for fear of competition
from other states and would not have granted it but for
that fear. Whenever competition from other states drives
the tax incentive, eliminating the competition does not
hurt the state and may aid its revenue-raising efforts
(assuming it can attract investment on other grounds,
which is typically the case).
Three additional points need to be made from a state
tax perspective. The first concerns the question of tax
incidence. Because the tax competition that is most
relevant to states concerns the corporate income tax, it is

36

Rosanne Altshuler and Harry Grubert, ‘‘Taxpayer Responses to Competitive Tax Policies and Tax Policy Responses to
Competitive Taxpayers: Recent Evidence,’’ Tax Notes Int’l, June
28, 2004, p. 1349.
37
See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills Jr., ‘‘Compared to What? Tiebout
and the Comparative Merits of Congress and the States,’’ in
Constitutional Federalism (2005), and articles cited therein.
38
Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka, ‘‘International Tax Competition and Gains From Tax Harmonization,’’ 37 Economics Letters
69 (1991).
39
Timo Viherkentta, Tax Incentives in Developing Countries and
International Taxation (1991).
40
Jean-Francois Hennart, ‘‘The Transaction Cost Theory of
the Multinational Enterprise,’’ in Pitelis and Sugden (eds.), The
Nature of the Transnational Firm (1991).
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41

John Dunning, Explaining International Production (1988).
Eric Bond, ‘‘Tax Holidays and Industry Behavior,’’ 63
Review of Economics and Statistics 88 (1981); Michael J. Boskin and
William G. Gale, ‘‘New Results on the Effects on Tax Policy on
the International Location of Investment,’’ in Martin Feldstein
(ed.), The Effects of Taxation on Capital Accumulation (1987); James
R. Hines Jr., ‘‘Lessons From Behavioral Responses to International Taxation,’’ 52 National Tax Journal 305 (1999).
43
Stephen E. Guisinger and Associates, Investment Incentives
and Performance Requirements (1985).
44
Peter Enrich, ‘‘Saving the States From Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business,’’
110 Harv. L. Rev. 377 (1996); Hellerstein and Coenen, supra note
7; Zelinsky, supra note 1.
42
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are becoming increasingly sensitive to tax considerations
in determining the location of their investments.36

COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT

invest somewhere in the United States, state tax competition involves a pure welfare loss and a windfall gain to
the MNE, because the benefits to the United States are the
same wherever the investment takes place.48 Thus, from
a national perspective, state and local tax competition to
attract MNEs, of the sort engaged in by Toledo, is
undesirable.

IV. What if Toledo Were a Country?
A. The WTO Rules
There are two articles of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade that bear directly on taxation. GATT
Article III provides that ‘‘internal taxes . . . should not be
applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford
protection to domestic production.’’ Because of the reference to products, that provision has generally been
understood as referring only to indirect taxes (that is,
excise taxes or consumption taxes like the VAT). However, even if the article is interpreted as referring to direct
taxes as well, it seems unlikely that the income tax in
particular can be used as an instrument for protecting
domestic production, because of the difficulty of designing income tax provisions that will apply only to foreign
production.
GATT Article XVI provides in general for notification
procedures in the case of any ‘‘subsidy . . . which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any
product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, [a
contracting party’s] territory.’’ The article also expressly
prohibits the use of any subsidy ‘‘on the export of any
product . . . which subsidy results in the sale of such
product for export at a price lower than the comparable
price charged for the like product to buyers in the
domestic market.’’ A note clarifies that the exemption of
an exported product from taxes borne by the like product
when destined for domestic consumption (like zero rating exports for the VAT) ‘‘shall not be deemed to be a
subsidy.’’
Article XVI was significantly expanded by the Subsidies Code included in the 1994 version of GATT. The
Subsidies Code defines ‘‘subsidy’’ as including cases
where ‘‘government revenue that is otherwise due is
foregone or not collected.’’ To be actionable under GATT,
a subsidy must be ‘‘specific to an enterprise or industry
or group of enterprises or industries.’’ Also, a specific
subsidy is prohibited only if it is ‘‘contingent, in law or in
fact . . . upon export performance’’ or ‘‘upon the use of
domestic over imported goods.’’ Annex I to the Subsidies
Code includes an ‘‘illustrative list of export subsidies’’
that includes ‘‘the full or partial exemption, remission, or
deferral specifically related to exports of direct
taxes . . . paid or payable by industrial or commercial
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Joseph A. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy (1987); U.S. Treasury,
Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing
Business Income Once (1992).
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Pechman, supra note 45.
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See Charles E. McLure Jr., ‘‘The State Corporate Income
Tax: Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing,’’ in Henry J. Aaron and
Michael J. Boskin, (eds.), The Economics of Taxation 327 (1980);
Charles E. McLure Jr., ‘‘The Elusive Incidence of the Corporate
Income Tax: The State Case,’’ 9 Pub. Fin. Q. 395 (1981).
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It is plausible to assume that a multinational like DaimlerChrysler would decide to locate its production in the United
States rather than in, for example, Canada or Mexico, because of
transportation costs and regulatory factors, even in the absence
of tariffs. See, e.g., Daimler’s decision to produce SUVs in
Alabama rather than in Mexico was because of transportation
costs that more than overcome any Mexican labor cost advantage.
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important to attempt to assess the incidence of that tax in
evaluating the effects of collecting it on the welfare of the
state. Unfortunately, after decades of analysis, no consensus exists on the incidence of the corporate tax. While the
older studies have tended to conclude that the tax is
borne by shareholders or by all capital providers, more
recent studies have suggested that the tax is borne to a
significant extent by consumers or by labor.45 Another
possibility is that the tax on established corporations was
borne by those who were shareholders when the tax was
imposed or increased, because thereafter it is capitalized
into the price of the shares.46 Yet a third possibility,
articulated by Charles McLure, is that the state corporate
income tax — and its economic incidence — should be
analyzed as a tax on the factors that are used to apportion
income to the state (namely, property, payroll, and sales,
in various proportions).47 It is unlikely that the debate
will be decided anytime soon (in fact, the incidence may
be shifting over time, especially as globalization may
enable corporations to shift more of the tax burden to
labor). However, from the perspective of a state deciding
whether to collect taxes from a multinational, three out of
the four possible alternatives for incidence (current
shareholders or capital providers, old shareholders, and
consumers) are largely the residents of other jurisdictions, and therefore, from a state welfare perspective, the
state gains by collecting the tax. And even if some of the
tax is shifted to labor in the state, it can be argued that as
a matter of tax administration it is more efficient (as well
as more politically acceptable) to collect the tax from the
multinational than to attempt to collect it from the
workers.
Second, it should be noted that a state may want to
collect taxes from multinationals even if in general it
believes that the private sector is more efficient in using
the resources than the public sector. That is because, in
the case of a foreign multinational, the taxes that the state
fails to collect may indeed be used by the private sector,
but in another jurisdiction, and therefore not benefit the
state. One possible solution, which is in fact employed by
states, is to refrain from taxing multinationals while they
reinvest domestically, but tax them on remittance of the
profits abroad. However, that taxation of dividends and
other forms of remittance is subject to the same tax
competition problem that we discussed above. Thus, it
would appear that overcoming the tax competition problem is in most cases in the interest of states, and the
question remains how to do so in the face of the
collective-action problem described above.
Finally, restricting state tax competition is in the
interest of the United States as a nation. From a U.S.
national perspective, once a multinational has decided to
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Importantly, the Subsidies Code applies only to goods,
not to services. Services are addressed in the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Because services
frequently involve FDI, in this case the line between trade
and investment is particularly blurred. Therefore, the
United States inserted provisions in GATS that prevent it
from overriding domestic tax legislation and income tax
treaties applicable to FDI. In particular, the provision of
national treatment for service providers can be avoided if
‘‘the difference in treatment is aimed at ensuring the
equitable and effective imposition or collection of direct
taxes.’’ In addition, most favored nation (MFN) treatment
can be avoided if the difference in treatment follows from
a tax treaty. GATS does not include a provision on
subsidies.

B. Application to Toledo
If Toledo were an independent country, the tax incentives granted to DaimlerChrysler would clearly violate
the Subsidies Code. First, they would have been a
subsidy, because Toledo refrains from collecting revenue
that it would otherwise have collected (and does collect
from other, similar businesses). Second, they would
clearly have been ‘‘specific to an enterprise’’ because they
were negotiated with DaimlerChrysler. Third, because
very few of the cars assembled in Toledo are in fact sold
in that city, the incentives would have been
‘‘contingent . . . in fact . . . upon export performance.’’
Thus, if another country were to launch a complaint in
the WTO’s dispute resolution body, Toledo would presumably lose. The WTO could also warn Toledo that it
was violating the Subsidies Code through its trade policy
review mechanism.49
Toledo is not a country, and therefore its tax incentives
probably are not a violation of GATT. GATT does in fact
apply to subnational taxes,50 and it could be argued that
the term ‘‘export’’ in the Subsidies Code refers to export
outside the jurisdiction granting the subsidy. However, I
believe the better view is that ‘‘export’’ refers only to
international exports, because that is the type of trade
addressed by GATT. Thus, because most or all of the cars
manufactured by DaimlerChrysler in Toledo are sold in
the United States, the tax incentive is not a violation of
GATT.
Still, as a policy matter, it is important to note that the
type of incentives granted by Toledo are contrary to
established WTO rules on export subsidies. We will
return to this issue in the conclusion.

49
See Michael Daly, ‘‘The WTO and Direct Taxation,’’ WTO
Discussion Paper No. 9 (June 2005).
50
See Charles E. McLure and Walter Hellerstein, ‘‘Does
Sales-Only Apportionment Violate International Trade Rules?’’
Tax Notes, Sept. 9, 2002, p. 1513.
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V. What if Toledo Were a Member of the EU?
A. The EU State Aid Rules
Under articles 87-89 of the Treaty of Rome, a ‘‘state
aid’’ is ‘‘incompatible with the common market’’ if it is an
‘‘aid’’ that is ‘‘conferred’’ in any form whatsoever (as long
as there is a financial benefit) by a member state out of
state resources, the aid is available only to some undertakings or products, and the aid distorts or threatens to
distort intracommunity competition and trade.51 Under
that language, numerous targeted tax incentives have
been struck down either by the European Commission or
by the ECJ.52
B. Application to Toledo
The tax incentive offered by Toledo would be a
prohibited state aid if Toledo were a member state. It
would have been an aid conferred out of state resources
to a particular company, and under well-established ECJ
precedents, it would distort intracommunity trade.53
Thus, the commission would probably take action
against it, and if necessary the ECJ would strike it down.
Of course, because Toledo is not a member state, the
EC Treaty is inapplicable. But the view of tax competition
embodied in it offers an interesting contrast to the view
taken by the U.S. Supreme Court.
VI. Conclusion: Why Cuno Should Be Affirmed
If the Supreme Court were starting from a clean slate,
it could have used Cuno to adopt the same policy
embodied in the EU and WTO rules: All targeted subsidies and tax incentives that distort trade and investment
within the United States should be prohibited under the
Commerce Clause. As explained above, that kind of
targeted tax competition among the states is not in the
best interest of the states themselves or of the United
States.54
But the Court has refused to treat subsidies as prohibited by the Commerce Clause, and it is unlikely to change
its mind.55 Nevertheless, I believe Cuno offers the Court
an opportunity to move forward on the issue, if it affirms
the distinction advocated by Profs. Hellerstein and Coenen and adopted by the Sixth Circuit: Subsidies are OK,
as are tax incentives granted to lure new business into the
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Article 87(1) EC. See generally Biondi, Eeckhout, and Flynn,
The Law of State Aid in the European Union (2004); Raymond H.C.
Luja, Assessment and Recovery of Tax Incentives in the EC and WTO
(2003).
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See Luja, supra note 51. The EU also has a ‘‘soft law’’ code
of conduct that requires member states to refrain from adopting
new tax incentives and roll back existing ones, under threat of
invocation of the ‘‘hard law’’ state aid provisions. See AviYonah, ‘‘Globalization,’’ supra note 13.
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See Luja, supra note 51.
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Note that this conclusion does not apply to the setting of
generally applicable tax rates, or to differences in the tax base or
the mix of taxes employed. The Commerce Clause does not
require states to levy an income tax at all, or at any rate. See
Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Globalization,’’ supra note 13, for a defense of this
distinction.
55
See Hellerstein and Coenen, supra note 7; Zelinsky, supra
note 1.
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enterprises.’’ However, a footnote clarifies that the language ‘‘is not intended to limit a Member from taking
measures to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source
income earned by its enterprises.’’
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likely to take the matter up because affirming Cuno will
lead to widespread doubts about the validity of other state
tax incentives. The Sixth Circuit decision has already
spawned proposed legislation, but a Supreme Court decision is likely to increase dramatically the relative importance of the issue on Congress’s legislative agenda.58
There is a reason both the WTO and the EU have
adopted a broad prohibition of the kind of tax incentive
at stake in Cuno: Those incentives distort investment
patterns, confer windfall gains on taxpayers, and force
the states into a prisoner’s dilemma. Congress, not the
Supreme Court, is best positioned to assess those policy
arguments. But the issue will receive congressional attention only if Cuno is affirmed. That is the fundamental
reason why the Court should affirm the Sixth Circuit
decision in Cuno.
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Hellerstein and Coenen, supra note 7.
For example, if the Supreme Court remanded Cuno to the
state courts and the state courts ruled against DaimlerChrysler
(adopting the Sixth Circuit’s analysis), DaimlerChrysler would
have standing in federal court to challenge the denial of a state
tax benefit on federal constitutional grounds. Alternatively, a
taxpayer that was denied the ITC because it failed to qualify for
its benefits would clearly have standing to challenge the denial
in federal court. Cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388
(1984) (entertaining taxpayer challenge to discriminatory state
tax incentive).
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‘‘Cuno and Congress: An Analysis of Proposed Federal Regulation Authorizing State Economic Development Incentives
(2005),’’ analyzing the Economic Development Act of 2005, S.
1066, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005); H.R. 2471, 109th Cong., 1st
Sess. (2005). As the article points out, Congress, in response to
Cuno, has already approved a narrow state tax incentive limited
essentially to taxpayers engaged in the production of electricity
from coal mined in the state that employs scrubbers or other
forms of clean coal technology.
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state, but tax incentives to existing businesses to prevent
them from moving are discriminatory and coercive. That
distinction is consistent with the Court’s previous precedents and can be maintained without overruling settled
law.56
The Court has three options in Cuno. It can reverse on
the standing issue, in which case it will simply postpone
the day until it addresses the issue on the merits, when a
taxpayer with unquestioned standing petitions for review.57 It can reverse on the merits, in which case harmful
tax competition will flourish. Or it can affirm on the
merits.
If the Court chooses to affirm on the merits, that will
transfer the debate to the body empowered by the Constitution to make those judgments: Congress. Congress is

